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NOTE
Meaningful Access: True Equality or
Frightening Reality?
Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC Childress, 932 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2019).
Mackenzie L. Stout*

I. INTRODUCTION
“It’s too good to be true” summarizes the decision in Childress v. Fox
Associates, LLC. The Childress court admirably aimed to create a more
accessible society for individuals with disabilities but may have
unintentionally created the exact opposite.
Courts require public
accommodations to provide “meaningful access” to individuals with
disabilities in order to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”).1 However, “meaningful access” is an unclear, evolving standard.
The Childress decision strayed from precedent by heightening the standard
for meaningful access to a level equal to identical access. While this
heightened standard strives for the goal of true equality, it consequently shifts
the focus of courts’ decisions to the sufficiency of a claimed affirmative
defense – that is, the requested accommodation would pose an undue buden.
Analyzing a case based on the sufficiency of an affirmative defense
– especially in the context of ADA Accommodations – is detrimental because
it forces courts to determine whether an accommodation must be provided at
all, instead of deciding what degree satisfies meaningful access. The

* B.S.B.A., University of Missouri, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of
Missouri School of Law, 2022; Editor-in-Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022.
I am grateful to Professor Oliveri for her insight, guidance, and support during the
writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing
process.
1. Person-first language is preferred when describing individuals with
disabilities. Therefore, the description “individuals with disabilities” has been
incorporated in this Note. See Tara Haelle, Identity-First vs. Person-First Language
is an Important Distinction, ASSOCIATION OF HEATH CARE JOURNALISTS (July 31,
2019),
https://healthjournalism.org/blog/2019/07/identity-first-vs-person-firstlanguage-is-an-important-distinction/ [https://perma.cc/8BZS-SZ66]; see, e.g.,
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (providing that “an otherwise qualified
handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that
the grantee offers”); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 (2001).
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framework for analyzing meaningful access set forth by the Childress
decision may create detrimental impacts long into the future.
Recognizing the need to create an accessible society for all people, this
Note highlights the positive strides the Childress Court aimed to establish, but
it also discusses the dangers this decision creates within litigation as future
decisions turn on the sufficiency of affirmative defenses. Part II of this Note
describes the facts, the lower court’s determination, and the ultimate holding
in Childress. Part III provides the legal background of the ADA and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s legal precedent for
“meaningful access” leading up to this decision. Part IV details the majority’s
decision to increase the standard for meaningful access for public
accommodations to comply with ADA requirements and the dissent’s
criticism of the majority’s deviation from precedent and the future impacts of
this decision. Part V comments on the specific ways this decision strays from
prior decisions within the Eighth Circuit and discusses the future implications
of this new standard.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Fox Associates, LLC (“Fox Theater”) is a large historic theater in St.
Louis, Missouri which hosts a variety of live Broadway shows.2 In April
2016, Childress contacted Fox Theater to request captioning for a
performance of Rent, a Broadway show scheduled to perform in May 2017.3
Although Fox Theater provided an American Sign Language (“ASL”)
interpreter at each production, Childress preferred closed captioning because
she was able to “experience the writer’s original dialogue and lyrics”
compared to receiving the lyrics through an interpreter.4 Fox Theater denied
this request and said it did not offer closed captioning at its shows and did not
plan to in the future.5 Following that denial, in June 2016, Childress filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under
Title III of the ADA.6 Plaintiff alleged Fox Theater violated Title III of the
ADA by failing to provide patrons with hearing impairments with

2. Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC Childress, 932 F.3d 1165, 1168 (8th Cir.
2019).
3. Id.
4. “Open” captioning includes visual captions that are automatically applied for
all viewers to see. Comparatively, with “closed” captions, viewers can turn these
captions on or off. John F. Waldo, The ADA and Movie Captioning: A Long and
Winding Road to an Obvious Destination, 45 Val. U. L. Rev. 1033, 1040 (2011)
(stating that individuals with hearing impairments tend to prefer open captioning);
Childress, 932 F.3d at 1168.
5. Id.
6. See 42 USC § 12182; Childress, 932 F.3d at 1169
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“meaningful access” to the theater’s productions.7 Plaintiff sought injunctive
relief and wanted Fox Theater to be ordered to “provide open or closed
captioning at all performances of theatrical productions; publicize the
availability of captioning and provide means to request captioning; enable
persons to purchase tickets to captioned performances by non-telephonic
means, including by electronic mail; and provide hands-free, line-of-sight
captioning devices.”8
After the complaint was filed, Fox Theater offered to amend its policies
to offer a single captioned performance for each Broadway production if the
patron requested the captioning within two weeks of the show.9 Additionally,
Fox Theater adjusted its ticket offerings to allow purchases through nontelephonic means for hearing-impaired patrons.10 Despite making these
adjustments, Fox Theater stated the captioned showing would only occur
during the day on a designated Saturday for each tour.11 Childress believed a
single showtime did not satisfy meaningful access as compared to the
numerous showtimes non-disabled individuals could attend.12 Due to the
persistent inequalities and difficulties even after Fox Theater’s adjustments,
Childress argued its policies still violated the ADA.13
Both parties filed for summary judgment. Plaintiff argued the
opportunities to participate in only one showing for each Broadway
production is unequal to the multiple showtimes and dates available to nondisabled patrons.14 Plaintiff claimed this policy violated § 12181(b)(1)(A)(ii)
and § 12181(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the ADA because the absence of auxiliary aids
and services caused the unequal treatment of individuals with hearing
7. The term “hearing impairments” and “hearing impaired individuals” is used
to reflect the language the court used in its opinion in Childress. See e.g., Childress,
932 F.3d at 1168–70.
8. Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC, 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL 1858157, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 2018), aff'd sub nom, Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC Childress,
932 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2019).
9. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1169; Childress, 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL
1858157, at *2.
10. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1169
11. Id. Fox Theater accommodated Childress’s request for a second captioned
performance of School of Rock, but explicitly stated it would not grant similar requests
in the future. Id.
12. Id. The term “non-disabled” is used as recommended by Student
Accessibility Services as Brown University. See Student Accessibility Services (SAS),
BROWN UNIVERSITY, https://www.brown.edu/campus-life/support/accessibilityservices/resources-teaching-students-disabilities/appropriate-terminology
[https://perma.cc/Q9G4-HYS9] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021); see also Equality Training,
The
Art
of
Respectful
Language,
http://www.equalitytraining.co.uk/images/news/language_of_respect.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9BGF-VWRH].
13. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1170.
14. Id. at 1169; Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC, 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL
1858157, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 2018).
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impairments.15 Further, Plaintiff believed Fox Theater was required to
provide closed captioning for each request in order to provide “equal
opportunity to the same benefit,” subject only to ADA’s “undue burden”
affirmative defense.16
Fox Theater argued its prior modifications to the existing policies were
reasonable and therefore complied with the “meaningful access”
requirement.17 First, Fox Theater argued it provided meaningful access to its
shows by captioning one performance of each production.18 Fox Theater
contended that one captioned production was reasonable because of the
expense of a live, in-person reporter to transcribe the words, lyrics, and other
sounds which was required for captioning.19 In essence, Fox Theater was
nominally invoking the ADA’s undue burden affirmative defense, which
holds that a defendant need not provide requested accommodations when
doing so would cause it financial hardship.20 However, Fox apparently
waived the right to formally assert this defense because it refused to turn over
financial information in discovery, which would have been necessary for a
determination of hardship.21 Although Fox Theater attempted to argue the
affirmative defense of undue burden on appeal, at the district level, the defense
had not been officially raised below and was therefore waived.22 Second, Fox
Theater claimed that requiring captioning for each request is not a reasonable
modification to its policies, practices, and procedures.23
The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and
denied Defendant’s motion.24 The court clarified that the provision of the
ADA applicable to the present lawsuit was 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii),
which governs the failure to provide auxiliary aids to individuals with
disabilities.25 Then, the court stated that to prevail on a Title III ADA
Discrimination claim the plaintiff must prove: (1) discrimination on the basis
15. Childress, No. 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL 1858157, at *3–4..
16. Id.
17. Id. at *4; see also Childress, 932 F.3d at 1170.
18. Childress, No. 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL 1858157, at *5.
19. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1169.
20. 42 USC § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also Childress, No. 4:16 CV 931 CDP,
2018 WL 1858157, at *3.
21. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1169–70, 1172.
22. Id. at 1172. “Fox presents no argument or evidence that “undue burden” or
“fundamental alteration” excuses its failure.” Childress, 2018 WL 1858157, at *4.
23. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1170.
24. Id.
25. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (describing discrimination as “a failure
to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is
excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other
individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can
demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good,
service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result
in an undue burden”).
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of a disability (2) in the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of the Fox Theater (3) by Fox
Theater’s owner, lessor, or operator.26
Analyzing arguments presented by both parties, the district court
determined Fox Theater did not provide “meaningful access” by captioning
only one showing per tour because that did not provide hearing impaired
individuals with equal opportunity to the same benefit – show offerings – as
non-disabled individuals as required under § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).27 The court
reasoned “a non-disabled, hearing person has the benefit of an expansive
selection of performances to attend at the Fox Theater and is not limited to
only one performance on a date preselected by the venue.”28
Following its declaration that Fox Theater was in violation of the ADA,
the district court granted injunctive relief.29 The court ordered Fox Theater
to:
provide open or closed captioning at all performances of theatrical
productions where captioning is requested at least two weeks in
advance; publicize the availability of captioning and provide a means
to request the accommodation; enable persons to purchase tickets to
captioned performance by non-telephonic means (including electronic
mail); and provide hands-free, line-of-sight captioning devices in areas
designated as accessible seating, and handheld captioning devices in
all other seating.30

Lastly, the court concluded by noting Fox Theater failed to assert an
affirmative defense of undue burden or fundamental alteration.31
Fox Theater appealed the grant of Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment.32 On appeal, Fox Theater argued the district court erred in granting
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying its motion because
hearing-impaired individuals received meaningful access to Fox Theater’s
productions.33 In response, Plaintiff argued Fox Theater did not provide
“meaningful access” to its productions by only captioning one show per tour
as compared to the numerous showtimes available to non-disabled
individuals.34

26. Fox does not dispute it is a place of public accommodation and is subject to
ADA requirements. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1170 n. 5.
27. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1169.
28. Childress, LLC, No. 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL 1858157, at *4.
29. Id. at *5–6.
30. Id. at *6.
31. Id. at *4.
32. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1170.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1171.
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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiff.35 The court concluded Fox Theater’s policy of
offering a single closed-captioned performance denied individuals with
hearing impairments an equal opportunity to gain the same benefit as persons
without hearing impairments.36 Therefore, the policy did not provide
individuals with hearing impairments with equal opportunity or “meaningful
access” to the benefits of the Fox Theater.37 The court noted that even though
Fox Theater failed to provide meaningful access, it could have prevailed by
raising an affirmative defense at the district level and proving that captioning
each requested performance would cause an undue financial burden.38
However, because Fox Theater failed to assert such defense at the district
level, the court refrained from further analysis on the matter.39 The court
concluded by providing a caveat to its decision stating “nothing precludes Fox
Associates from bringing its own lawsuit and seeking to modify the district
court’s order in this case” if the requested captioning reached the level of an
undue burden in the future. 40
The Childress Court concluded that absent an affirmative defense, when
an individual with a disability is faced with limited availability of public
offerings because of a lack of auxiliary aids, the individual does not receive
equal opportunity to the benefit and, therefore, the public accommodation has
failed to provide “meaningful access” as required by the ADA.41

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part discusses the legal framework of the ADA and courts’
interpretation of this statute. Subpart A discusses the enactment of the ADA
and focuses on Title III which governs places of public accommodations.
Subpart B describes the “meaningful access” standard which courts use to
determine whether public accommodation’s provided aids and
accommodations comply with the ADA. Subpart C discusses two common
affirmative defenses against ADA claims – the undue burden and fundamental
alteration defenses. Finally, Subpart D illustrates the evolution of the Eighth
Circuit’s standard of “meaningful access” over the years.

35. Id. at 1173.
36. Id. at 1172.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1171.
39. Id. at 1171–72.
40. Id. at 1172.
41. Id.
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A. Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA was enacted on January 26, 1990.42 The enactment was
sparked by Congress’s realization that a “compelling need” existed for an
official mandate to eliminate discrimination against individuals with
disabilities and integrate them “into the economic and social mainstream of
American life.”43
The ADA is an expansive statute which forbids discrimination against
individuals with disabilities in major areas of public life including
employment (Title I), public services (Title II), and public accommodations
(Title III).44 Although these categories are inherently broad, specific places
like theaters and concert halls are well-recognized “public
accommodations.”45 Section 12182 (b)(2)(A)(iii) – the provision of the ADA
relevant in this case – prohibits public accommodations from denying
disabled individuals “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, advantages, or accommodations.”46 A public accommodation
violates the ADA by failing to take measures to ensure individuals with
disabilities are not denied “services, segregated, or otherwise treated
differently . . . because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services.”47
Nevertheless, a public accommodation’s failure to make necessary
adjustments to ensure complete accessibility does not violate the ADA if
taking such measures would cause an undue burden or fundamentally alter the
nature of the good or service.48
A public accommodation must determine what auxiliary aid or service
needs to be provided to ensure “effective communication” for an individual
with a disability.49 Effective auxiliary aids must be accessible, provided in a
timely manner, and maintain the privacy and independence of the disabled
individual.50

42. Gathright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th
Cir. 2006).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(5); S. REP. NO. 101–16 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101–
485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990).
44. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (1990).
46. 42 USC § 12182(a), (b)(2)(A)(iii) (1990).
47. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1990).
48. Id.
49. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c).
50. § 4:97. Effective communication must be ensured, 1 Americans with Disab.:
Pract. & Compliance Manual § 4:97; see also Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist.,
701 F.3d 334, 343 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “proper inquiry” regarding
“necessary” auxiliary aids and services is whether the aid provides equal opportunity
to same benefit).
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B. The “Meaningful Access” Standard
Under Title III of the ADA, a public accommodation must provide
auxiliary aids and services for individuals with disabilities if such aids or
services are necessary to enjoy “meaningful access” to the accommodation.51
Courts conduct a fact-based inquiry to determine whether an individual with
a disability has received “meaningful access.”52 A public accommodation’s
refusal to provide auxiliary aids and services does not automatically create a
violation of the ADA.53 Such refusal only violates the ADA if the aid is
necessary for a disabled individual to receive “meaningful access.”54
Therefore, if a court determines an aid is required for an individual to receive
meaningful access, the public accommodation must provide the requested aid
unless doing so would be an undue burden or fundamentally alter the nature
of the provided benefit.55

C. Affirmative Defenses to ADA Claims
There are two common affirmative defenses raised by public
accomodations: (1) undue burden, or (2) fundamental alteration of its goods
or services.56 The burden to prove an affirmative defense is on the place of
public accommodation,57 and if a defendant fails to raise an affirmative
defense at the district court level, this constitutes a waiver of such defense on
appeal.58
The “undue burden” defense raised by the public accommodation is
analyzed using a fact-based inquiry which determines whether providing the
requested aids and accommodations would cause significant difficulty or
expense.59 To make this determination, courts identify the nature and cost of
the proposed accommodation along with the financial resources of the place
of public accommodation.60 This identification requires courts to additionally
consider the number of persons employed by the public accommodation and
the effect the request may have on the site’s workplace and operation safety.61
51. Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2013).
52. Id.
53. Durand v. Fairview Health Servs., 902 F.3d 836, 842 (8th Cir. 2018).
54. Id.
55. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 688 (2001).
56. See Roberts ex rel. Roberts v. KinderCare Learning Ctrs., Inc., 86 F.3d 844,
847 (8th Cir. 1996); McGann v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 873 F.3d 218, 230–31 (3d Cir.
2017).
57. McGann, 873 F.3d at 231.
58. Warner Bros. Ent., Inc. v. X One X Prods., 840 F.3d 971, 980 (8th Cir. 2016).
59. McGann, 873 F.3d at 231 (remanding case to district court to conduct fact
intensive inquiry of undue burden).
60. Id.
61. Roberts ex rel. Roberts, 86 F.3d at 846.
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An example of the Eighth Circuit finding that a requested
accommodation would cause an undue burden can be seen in Roberts ex rel.
v. KinderCare Learning Centers, Inc. 62
In Roberts ex rel., the court
determined that requiring a one-on-one assistant for a child with a disability
at KinderCare’s child care center amounted to an undue burden.63 The court
determined it was an undue burden because KinderCare would have to hire
another employee to assist with this task, and it would cost $205 per week to
pay the employee while the child was only paying $105 in tuition.64
Additionally, evidence of KinderCare’s hardship was proven through
previous closures of other locations due to financial difficulties.65 Lastly,
KinderCare provided proof of their limited budget, solidifying its defense that
the requested accommodation would cause an undue burden.66
Alternatively, if a defendant raises the affirmative defense of
fundamental alternation, it must prove the accommodation would
“fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege,
advantage, or accommodation being offered.”67 The Eighth Circuit requires
a high standard to satisfy the fundamental alteration defense.68 In PGA Tour,
Inc. v. Martin, Martin, a golfer, suffered from a circulatory disease which
made it difficult for him to walk.69 Although the PGA Tour typically required
golfers to walk the golf course, Martin requested an accommodation to drive
the golf-cart from hole to hole due to his illness.70 PGA Tour refused Martin’s
accommodation by arguing this adjustment would be a fundamental alteration
of the nature of the competition.71 The United States Supreme Court ruled in
favor of Martin and rejected the fundamental alteration defense because it
noted that the golf cart provided Martin the ability to compete in a competition
he would otherwise not be able to because of his disability, and did not
fundamentally alter the competition itself.72

62. Roberts ex rel. Roberts, 86 F.3d at 847.
63. Id. at 846.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 845.
66. Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
68. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 (2001); see also McGann v.
Cinemark USA, Inc., 873 F.3d 218, 219–20 (3d Cir. 2017) (rejecting argument that
providing an interpreter at movie theater would be a fundamental alternation of
theater’s services because the theater did not previously provide such accommodation
in its normal course of business. The court noted that an interpreter did not cause
significant changes to the video, audio, or physical environment).
69. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 668.
70. Id. at 669.
71. Id. at 670.
72. Id. at 690.
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D. The Historically Low Bar to Satisfy Meaningful Access
Over the years, many cases handed down by the Eighth Circuit indicated
that public accomodations do not have to meet a high threshold to prove that
the plaintiff received meaningful access.73 In 2009, the Eighth Circuit
analyzed “meaningful access” in Mason v. Correctional Medical Services,
Inc.74 In Mason, a prisoner with visual impairments alleged the jail failed to
provide him with meaningful access to the prison benefits because of the lack
of auxiliary aids and services.75 The jail provided Mason with an assistant to
help him read in the library and use the recreation center, but Mason alleged
this was not meaningful access because the library did not have braille
material, and the assistant was not always available when he wanted to use
the prison’s resources.76 Although Mason was limited with his access to the
library and recreation center, the court determined Mason was still provided
with meaningful access and the did not need to provide braille or other
computer software system.77
Two years later, the court analyzed meaningful access in Loye v. County
of Dakota.78 In Loye, the County had to notify its residents after a local
mercury contamination.79 The plaintiffs, local hearing-impaired residents,
sued the County and alleged it failed to provide meaningful access to the
communication relaying the news of the contamination because an interpreter
was not available for each message.80 The County moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted its motion, determining that
meaningful access was satisfied because the plaintiffs received effective
communication during “relevant periods.”81 On appeal, the judgment was
affirmed, and the court concluded meaningful access was achieved even
though the availability of the interpreter was limited.82

73. Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880, 887 (8th Cir. 2009).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 883.
76. Id. at 887.
77. Id.
78. Loye v. Cty. of Dakota, 625 F.3d 494, 496 (8th Cir. 2010) (analyzing
meaningful access until Title II which covers governmental entities. This case is used
as a support because Title II and III require a similar “meaningful access” standard).
79. Id. at 495.
80. Id. at 496.
81. The court determined the Plaintiffs received effective communication
without an interpreter during the decontamination process through lip reading and
gesturing because the County was acting in response to an emergency. Id. at 496–99.
During the large group meetings, the County provided an interpreter which satisfied
effective communication. Id. at 498. Lastly, during the family meetings, an interpreter
was provided at two of the three meetings which was deemed as effective
communication. Id. at 499–501.
82. Id. at 501.
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The Eighth Circuit furthered its precedent that “meaningful access” may
be satisfied with minimal or sporadic accommodations in Argenyi v.
Creighton University.83 In Argenyi, the district court granted Creighton’s
motion for summary judgment and determined the plaintiff, a hearingimpaired medical student, received meaningful access when he was provided
with one of the three requested hearing accommodations under Title III of the
ADA.84 The student requested a Communication Access Real-Time machine
to transcribe spoken words on a computer screen; a translator for his labs; and
an FM system which would transmit sound into his ears from a selected group
of students.85 Despite this request, Creighton only provided the FM system.86
The plaintiff alleged this single accommodation did not “provide for
meaningful participation or independence as a student” and the single
accommodation put him at a disadvantage academically.87 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit described a seemingly low standard for meaningful access by
stating that aids and services provided to individuals with disabilities were not
required to produce an “identical result or level of achievement for
handicapped and nonhandicapped persons.”88 The court further explained
such accommodations only had to afford individuals with disabilities “equal
opportunity to the same benefit.”89 After providing this description, the court
ultimately reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and
remanded the case finding a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the plaintiff was denied an equal opportunity to benefit from the
medical school.90
The Eighth Circuit maintained a seemingly low standard for meaningful
access in Durland v. Fairview Health Services when it determined that a
public accommodation satisfied meaningful access even when the provided
accommodations could recognizably be improved.91 In Durland, the
plaintiffs, a mother and father, both suffered from hearing impairments.92 The
plaintiffs sued the hospital for failing to provide meaningful access to the

83. Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 451 (8th Cir. 2013).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 444. FM Systems (“Radio Aids”) assist individuals with hearing
impairments by picking up sound close to its source and transmitting the noise to the
individual in an improved, clearer manner by reducing background noise. FM
Systems,
HEARING
LINK,
(last
visited
Nov.
2,
2020),
https://www.hearinglink.org/living/loops-equipment/fm-systems/
[https://perma.cc/2YLP-G6AM].
86. Argenyi, 703 F.3d at 444.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 449 (quoting Loye v Cnty. of Dakota, 625 F.3d 494, 499 (8th Cir.
2010)).
89. Id. (quoting Loye v Cnty. of Dakota, 625 F.3d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 2010)).
90. Id. at 448.
91. Durand v. Fairview Health Servs., 902 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 2018).
92. Id. at 839.
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hospital’s communication when their son was a patient.93 To communicate
with plaintiffs, the hospital provided an interpreter and offered a TTY
machine,94 but the plaintiffs declined use of the TTY machine.95 The court
explicitly acknowledged the hospital’s accommodations could have been
improved, but the paintiffs still received the communication, therefore, they
received meaningful access to the hospital’s services.96

IV. INSTANT DECISION
This Part details the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Childress. Subpart A
discusses the majority’s decision to affirm the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. Subpart B explains the dissent’s strong
criticism of the majority’s decision and its caution about the future impacts
that may result.

A. Majority
The majority defined “meaningful access” as the equal opportunity for
an individual with a disability to gain the same benefit as an individual without
a disability.97 Additionally, the majority stated if an individual requires an
auxiliary aid or service to receive that same benefit, then the public
accommodation must provide an aid, but it can decide which form of aid it
supplies.98 Following this rule, the court noted the large exception that a
public accommodation does not have to provide the auxiliary aid or service if
doing so would cause an undue burden or fundamental alteration the nature of
the provided benefit.99
The majority’s decision to affirm the district court resulted from Fox
Theater’s failure to offer additional captioned showtimes for each Broadway
tour.100 The court determined this single offering “excludes individuals with
hearing impairments from ‘the economic and social mainstream of American

93. Id.
94. A TTY machine is a special device for hearing-impaired individuals where
messages can be typed back and forth to communicate. What is a TTY?,
ABOUTTTY.COM, http://www.abouttty.com [https://perma.cc/39NR-GV82] (last
visited Sept. 21, 2020).
95. Durand, 902 F.3d at 840.
96. Id. at 842.
97. Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC, 932 F.3d 1165, 1171 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Argenyi v. Creighton, 703 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2013)).
98. Id.
99. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
100. The second showing for School of Rock was provided with a disclosure by
Fox Theater that this was an exception to its policy and it would not grant similar
requests in the future. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1171.
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life[,]’” which furthers the discrimination that the ADA sought to abolish.101
Therefore, the court determined Fox Theater did not provide meaningful
access for individuals with disabilities compared to non-disabled patrons who
can choose from a variety of showtimes.102 The court acknowledged the
plaintiffs assertion that Fox Theater’s existing ASL interpreter at each show
did not satisfy meaningful access for hearing impaired individuals because the
third party prevented them from experiencing the author’s dialogue
personally.103 Although the court concluded Fox Theater violated the ADA
and failed to provide meaningful access, it noted Fox Theater could have
prevailed by raising the affirmative defense of undue burden and proving the
expense of captioning, but it refused to explicitly raise that defense.104
Although the court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, it provided a caveat to its
decision by stating Fox Theater could bring its own lawsuit in the future to
modify the district court’s orders if the requests for captioning reached the
level of an undue burden.105

B. Dissent
The dissent expressed its concern for the majority’s decision by opening
with a strong declaration: “[A] litigation strategy can result in bad law leading
to unforeseen consequences.”106 The dissent claimed the majority’s
expansion of the meaningful access standard strayed from precedent and
“undercut” the standard set before by the Eighth Circuit.107 Moreover, the
dissent argued the conclusion reached in Childress was a result of Fox
Theater’s purposeful failure to raise the affirmative defense of undue burden
in its motion for summary judgment, even though it clearly recognized the
substantial cost of a live captioning.108 The dissent would have upheld the
Eighth Circuit’s precedent of a lower standard for meaningful access, which
only required a public accommodation to provide “necessary aids,” not every
aid requested.109
101. Id. at 1172 (quoting McGann v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 873 F.3d 218, 230
(8th Cir. 2017)).
102. Id. at 1171.
103. Id. at 1168.
104. Fox Theater explicitly stated that it was “not asserting the affirmative
defense [ ] of ‘undue burden’ ....” Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC, No.
4:16 CV 931 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 22, 2018); Childress, 932 F.3d at 1171–72. The court
pointed out Fox Theater expressly stated that adding the additional captioned shows
was not a fundamental alteration, so this defense was also waived. Childress, 932 F.3d
at 1172 n.7.
105. Id. at 1172.
106. Id. at 1174 (Grasz, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Along with the criticism of the majority’s decision to deviate from
precedent, the dissent feared the implications that may result from the
majority’s decision.110 The dissent believed the law governing ADA
compliance requires courts to decide the extent of necessary aids that must be
provided to achieve meaningful access without considering possible
affirmative defenses.111 The dissent opposed the majority’s heightened
standard for meaningful access and argued that by requiring Fox Theater to
accommodate each request for captioning, “meaningful access” became a
requirement of identical access.112 Further, by increasing this standard to such
a high degree, the dissent warned that cases would be forced to turn on the
validity of affirmative defenses, and therefore, decisions could result in the
absence of an accommodation altogether.113
The dissent argued that Fox Theater did provide meaningful access
through its ASL interpreter and other accommodations and it did not violate
the ADA because the standard is meaningful, not identical, access.114
Therefore, with this lower standard, the dissent claimed meaningful access
was satisfied because individuals with hearing impairments could attend a
specified showing for each Broadway show.115

V. COMMENT
The decision in Childress diverges from precedent in the Eighth Circuit
by increasing the standard for meaningful access.116 Previously, under
Argenyi, defendants could satisfy meaningful access without providing each
requested accommodation.117 Additionally, as Argenyi indicated, an
accommodation could arguably provide meaningful access regardless of how
beneficial the aid was for the individual.118 Moreover, under Mason, the
Eighth Circuit determined meaningful access was satisfied even when the
accommodations were provided in a limited capacity and on sporadic
occasions.119 The court reiterated the notion that if there was some way to
access the accommodation, regardless of its frequency or beneficial results,
meaningful access was achieved.120 These cases illustrate the court’s prior

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1175.
116. Id.
117. Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2013).
118. Id.
119. Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880, 887–88 (8th Cir. 2009).
120. See, e.g., id. at 888 (meaningful access satisfied even when the hearingimpaired prisoner’s assistant was not always available); Loye v. Cty. of Dakota, 625
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focus on the ultimate benefit received from an accommodation compared to
the manner in which the benefit was obtained.121
Moving away from a previously low requirement for “meaningful
access,” the Childress Court heightened the standard to require not only
meaningful, but apparently identical, access for individuals with disabilities,
absent proof of an affirmative defense.122 Unlike the single accommodation
which initially sufficed in Argenyi, or the clear recognition that provided aids
could be improved in Durland, the Childress Court required Fox Theater to
provide more than one accommodation because the additional aids provided
an increased benefit.123 The Childress decision sought to ensure that
individuals with disabilities can obtain the same benefit in the best manner
possible, which often requires multiple aids and accommodations.124
After Childress, a public accommodation cannot simply provide an
adequate accommodation to satisfy meaningful access, it must provide
numerous accommodations of the highest quality. This shift in requirement
is evidenced by the court’s refusal to settle on the ASL interpreter Fox Theater
previously provided.125 The court increased the meaningful access standard
to an apparently “identical access” standard by requiring Fox Theater to
provide captioning at each requested performance, thereby giving patrons
with hearing impairments the same freedom to choose from a variety of
showtimes.126 The Childress Court focused on the ultimate benefit
individuals with disabilities received while also ensuring equality in the
manner that the benefit was obtained using proper aids and
accommodations.127
While the decision in Childress provides hope for a future where
“meaningful access” amounts to truly equal access for individuals with
disabilities utilizing the best aids and accommodations, this heightened
standard may lead to undesirable consequences in litigation. The Childress
decision requires public accommodations to provide equal, seemingly
identical, access for individuals with disabilities.128 The majority reached this
conclusion without regard to the potential cost of compliance for the
defendant because the Fox Theater refused to assert the undue burden
defense.129 This refusal is perplexing, and is likely explained by the fact that
F.3d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 2010) (meaningful access was satisfied when the interpreter
was not provided at each meeting for hearing-disabled residents).
121. Mason, 559 F.3d at 888.
122. See Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC, 932 F.3d 1165, 1174 (8th Cir. 2019)
(Grasz, J., dissenting).
123. Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2013); Durand v.
Fairview Health Servs., 902 F.3d 836, 842 (8th Cir. 2018).
124. See Childress, 932 F.3d at 1171.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1174–75 (Grasz, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 1171 (majority opinion).
128. See id. at 1174 (Grasz, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1171–72 (majority opinion).
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Fox Theater did not want to produce financial records during discovery.130
Despite recognizing this importance for true equality, the court protected itself
with a safeguard by stating Fox Theater can bring its own claim in the future
to adjust the district court’s ruling if the captioning requests resulted in an
undue burden.131
This caveat could lead to endless litigation as Fox Theater or similarly
situated defendants seek to modify current accommodations any time
financial difficulties arise. Furthermore, proving these financial difficulties
upon refiling may be even easier for the public accommodation due to the
imposition created the heightened “meaningful access” standard. The public
accomodation’s seamless path to proving an “undue burden” could prevail as
an affirmative defense to an accommodation altogether, or at the very least,
reduce the accomodations currently provided. The court’s safeguard instills
constant fear that current aids and accommodations could be stripped away at
any moment based on these future claims.
At first blush, the overall decision in Childress seems generally positive
for the disability rights community. However, as the dissent rightfully
indicated, the impacts this decision may have in litigation could directly
contradict the goal of creating a more accessible society.132 A heightened
standard for meaningful access provides a gold standard where all individuals,
regardless of a disability, are afforded identical access and equal opportunity
to the benefit of a public accommodation. However, this increased standard
simply forces the weight of the argument to the affirmative defense of undue
burden. The higher the standard for meaningful access, the more likely the
accommodation is to create an undue burden. While Fox Theater refused to
assert this defense, it is likely – indeed almost certain – that most future ADA
defendants will.
As this new standard plays out in litigation, cases may turn on the
sufficiency of affirmative defenses which would be frightening as the success
of these claims could result in a complete lack of accommodation or aid
provided. For example, with this heightened standard, plaintiffs are likely to
prevail in proving that a public accommodation has not satisfied this high
standard for meaningful access, but the danger lies from this point forward.133
Once a plaintiff prevails, this leaves the case to turn on the sufficiency of a
defendant proving an affirmative defense, which will only be easier given the
heightened (and presumably more expensive) compliance requirements.
Thus, Childress may have set ADA plaintiffs up to win the battle but lose the
war.
Prior to the Childress decision, meaningful access was determined by
what degree of an accommodation needed to be provided – at what point

130. Id. at 1172 n.7.
131. Id. at 1172.
132. Id. at 1174 (Grasz, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1174–75.
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meaningful access was obtained.134 Could the public accommodation achieve
meaningful access by providing three of four requested accommodations?
The analysis ended before reaching an affirmative defense. Now, relying
heavily on the success of an affirmative defense in response to the heightened
standard, courts may determine defendants do not have to provide any sort of
aid or accommodation because of the “burden” which may result from
satisfying such a high standard for meaningful access. This outcome is scary
for individuals with disabilities and society overall. Furthermore, even if the
affirmative defense fails, the Childress decision leaves the door open for
defendants to refile in the future if a financial burden develops from
complying with this new heightened standard. This caveat could create never
ending litigation and a constant threat of accommodations disappearing in the
future. Therefore, what seems like a positive increase in the requirement for
meaningful access could create detrimental realizations as this new standard
unfolds in litigation.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Childress decision increased the standard of meaningful access by
requiring public accommodations to provide individuals with disabilities an
equal, seemingly identical, access to achieve the same benefit as non-disabled
individuals. This decision strayed from prior determinations in the Eighth
Circuit and made admirable strides for a future where all individuals,
regardless of disability, receive identical means of access to achieve the same
benefit. Although Childress created an admirable “gold standard” for
meaningful access, the practicalities of such a high standard may result in
future litigation turning on the sufficiency of an affirmative defense which
dangerously creates an all or nothing battle.

134. See, e.g., Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2013);
Durand v. Fairview Health Servs., 902 F.3d 836, 842 (8th Cir. 2018).
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